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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case illustrates the wisdom in the adage attributed to Ben Franklin - that an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure. Ms. Diaz's first probation officer "really didn't try very
hard to get [her] involved in treatment, to get things going better," (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14), and as a
result, did not intervene as Ms. Diaz experienced a full relapse during which she nearly died
from an overdose.

However, as defense counsel subsequently pointed out, by providing

Ms. Diaz with a meaningful opportunity on probation, one with proper supervision and
appropriate terms, probation could still achieve the ultimate goal of rehabilitation. As such, the
district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Following her conviction by a jury of driving under the influence of narcotics, the district
court retained jurisdiction so Ms. Diaz could participate in a rider program. (Supp. R., pp.12527 .)1 Ms. Diaz successfully completed the rider program and, despite having some disciplinary
issues, the staff recommended the district court suspend her sentence for a period of probation.
(Addendum to Presentence Report, pp.1-3.) The district court followed that recommendation,
suspending her unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, for a fifteen-year period
of probation. (R., pp.18-21.)
Unfortunately, as the district court ultimately found, Ms. Diaz was initially supervised by
"a probation officer who really didn't try very hard to get [her] involved in treatment, to get
things going better." (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14.) That probation officer felt Ms. Diaz was performing
well during the first few months of her probation, and, as a result, resisted the prosecutor's
efforts to initiate probation violation proceedings following an incident in May 2017 where
Ms. Diaz was cited for driving without privileges. (See Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.2 (the prosecutor
explaining the probation officer was "kind of fighting us because he couldn't believe that we
even filed a probation violation over something like that"); see also Tr., p.19, Ls.7-9, p.20,
L.21 - p.21, L.2 (defense counsel agreeing that the probation officer's evaluation of Ms. Diaz's
progress may have been overstated, though noting she had, in fact, made some progress, such as
by participating in the Recovery For Life pro gram and by earning her six-month certificate in the
Chrysalis House program).)
However, once a new probation officer was assigned to Ms. Diaz's case, it became
apparent that the May 201 7 incident was just the first warning flag that, despite her initial
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References to "Supp. R." are to the record prepared in Ms. Diaz's initial appeal, Docket No.
43870, which the Supreme Court ordered be augmented to the record in this case. (R., p.2.)
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progress, Ms. Diaz was experiencing a relapse. (See R., pp.42-46 (the new probation officer’s
report of violation detailing several violations of the terms of probation in the months following
the May 2017 incident).) Ms. Diaz explained that she had gotten prideful with her initial
progress, which led her to get complacent. (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-13.) Then she was laid off due to
her employer downsizing. (See Tr., p.20, Ls.14-20.) As a result, she stopped making as much
progress as she had been, which discouraged her, but rather than re-engaging in the programs,
Ms. Diaz admitted she let herself indulge in self-pity instead.

(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-17.) She

explained that this led to letting herself get into more and more compromising situations, which
culminated with her nearly-fatal overdose. (Tr., p.23, Ls.18-22; see R., pp.42-46 (noting that,
during that time, Ms. Diaz had begun associating with other people with felony convictions, and
she had begun using drugs and committing other offenses with them).)
The effects of Ms. Diaz’s relapse continued after the report of violation was filed, as she
continued to be late for, or miss, urinalysis tests, some of which tested positive for narcotics,
during her time on pretrial release. (See R., pp.53-54, 75.) However, she did also provide
documentation showing that she had been given several narcotic medications during hospital
visits immediately prior to the first positive tests. (See R., pp.53-54 (the pretrial release officer’s
affidavit explaining the alleged violations).)

Ms. Diaz ultimately admitted several violations of

the terms of her probation. (Tr., p., L.12 - p.5, L.7.) The district court revoked her pretrial
release at that time. (Tr., p.11, L.25.) Ms. Diaz explained that actually turned out to be a
blessing because, during that time in jail, she was able to get control of the relapse. (Tr., p.24,
Ls.19-23.) The district court actually acknowledged that fact, stating “I think you are better than
you were because of the custody. I think it’s given you a little bit more control.” (Tr., p.29,
Ls.1-3.)
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Ms. Diaz acknowledged the reasonableness of the prosecutor's ensumg request for
revocation and incarceration, particularly given the number of treatment opportunities she had
been provided. (Tr., p.25, Ls.2-11.)

However, she did ask the district court for another

opportunity to build on the progress she had initially made. (Tr., p.25, Ls.12-23; see Tr., p.19,
Ls. 7-14 (defense counsel pointing out that Ms. Diaz has been able to make some progress when
under the proper supervision).) The new GAIN-I evaluation conducted in anticipation of the
disposition hearing concluded that Ms. Diaz "appears to be able to be managed safely at 1.0-OP
LOC level of care." (PSI, p.46.) Additionally, defense counsel noted that Ms. Diaz had housing
and employment options ready and waiting for her, if she were returned to probation. (Tr., p.19,
L.21 - p.20, L.9.) As a result, defense counsel recommended the district court return Ms. Diaz to
probation under appropriate supervision and terms of release. (E.g., Tr., p.29, Ls.8-14).
The district court, however, decided to revoke Ms. Diaz's probation because "we don't
have anything sufficient in the community to deal with the level of addiction and addiction
related crimes that you are presenting."

(Tr., p.29, Ls.4-7.)

As a result, it executed her

underlying sentence without modification. 2 (R., pp.83-84.) Ms. Diaz filed a notice of appeal
timely from the order revoking her probation. (R., pp.86-87.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Ms. Diaz's probation and
executed her underlying sentence.
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Ms. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for reduction of that sentence, but the district court
denied that motion because it was not supported by any additional information. (R., pp.91-97.)
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Diaz's Probation And Executed
Her Underlying Sentence
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation."

State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510

(Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a
violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and
whether continued probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho
525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court's
discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). A district court abuses its
discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer limits of
that discretion, does not act consistently with the controlling precedent, or does not reach a
decision based on an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64
(2018). In this case, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors demonstrates the district
court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason.
As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, when terms of probation, though otherwise
proper, are "impossible or nearly impossible for [the defendant] to fulfill," they do not "serve the
ultimate goal of rehabilitation." State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 2007). Thus,
in Wakefield, the Court found that, even though the district court had the authority to order the
defendant to pay more each month toward restitution, it abused its discretion by doing so because
it did not sufficiently consider his current ability to pay and the increase would use up most of
his apparent income, thus making it impossible to fulfill that and all the other terms of his
probation. Id. at 273-74.
The district court's decision to revoke Ms. Diaz's probation represents a similar failure to
appropriately consider all the relevant factors. In particular, it did not sufficiently consider the
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fact that Ms. Diaz’s probation officer’s failure to engage in proper supervision of her term of
probation, like the order in Wakefield, set Ms. Diaz up to fail on probation. He “really didn’t try
very hard to get [her] involved in treatment, to get things going better,” and fought against
intervention efforts when the first warning flag appeared. (See Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.2, p.26,
Ls.11-14.)

As such, Ms. Diaz did not receive the sort of support (through supervision,

intervention, and correction) that would have given her a meaningful opportunity to be
successful on probation.
Moreover, by the time the initial probation officer’s lax oversight was addressed and a
new probation officer assigned to the case, Ms. Diaz was already in a full relapse. It was not
until Ms. Diaz’s pretrial release was revoked that she was finally able to get control over the
situation. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3 (the district court noting, “I think you are better than you were
because of the custody. I think it’s given you a little bit more control.”); see also Tr., p.24,
Ls.13-18 (Ms. Diaz acknowledging the responsibility for the relapse and for staying in control of
those situations ultimately lay with her).) In other words, the new probation officer was left to
play catch up, to try and get control of the relapse, rather than help Ms. Diaz develop and
implement a meaningful plan to promote her continued rehabilitation.

Therefore, though

revoking probation was within the district court’s authority it was, like the order in Wakefield, an
abuse of discretion to exercise that authority without adequately considering the fact that
Ms. Diaz was not actually afforded a meaningful opportunity to be successful throughout the
period of probation.
Additionally, the fact that Ms. Diaz experienced this relapse does not mean she could not
be successful on probation, if she were subject to proper supervision and terms. Compare United
States v. Hawkins, 380 F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he fact that the
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defendant engaged in further criminal activity while she was in the process of rehabilitation does
not preclude a finding of extraordinary rehabilitation" or the imposition of a more lenient
sentence in recognition of that fact). After all, as the most recent GAIN-I evaluation pointed out,
Ms. Diaz's substance abuse issues could be managed safely in a Level 1 Out-Patient program.
(PSI, p.46.) There was, in fact, programming available to her. (See PSI, p.196 (noting that
Ms. Diaz was welcome to return to the Love and Unity program upon her release).) She had
housing available at a "safe release house" and an offer for a managerial position with a previous
employer. (Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.9.) As such, the district court did not consider all the
relevant circumstances when it concluded there was not anything sufficient in the community to
deal Ms. Diaz's needs or level of addiction. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.4-7.)
Rather, a sufficient consideration of all the relevant factors reveals that the ounce of
prevention available through placing Ms. Diaz on probation with the proper supervision and
terms was worth more than the pound of cure the district court dosed up by ordering Ms. Diaz be
incarcerated. As such, the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order revoking her probation
and remand this case so she can be returned to probation under appropriate supervision.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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